This panel exists to take apart a single, common misconception: that Lean equals standardization, and that standardization means inflexibility. The pandemic gave the panel its evidence. During COVID-19, some organizations froze and some adapted at remarkable speed -- redeploying people, redesigning processes, solving problems in real time. The panel's argument is that the difference was not luck or resources. It was Lean thinking and daily continuous improvement.
The deeper claim, threaded through the whole conversation, is counterintuitive: structure is what unleashes flexibility and creativity, not what limits it. Standard work, far from boxing teams in, is what lets them adapt fast when conditions change -- because you cannot improve a process you have not first defined, and because stable processes free people to think about the harder problems. The panel uses healthcare's pandemic experience as its case material, but the lessons are framed as applying to any organization in any environment of constant change, because uncertainty is not temporary.
Mark Graban hosted. The session was organized in partnership with Lean Frontiers.
Dr. John Toussaint is an internist, a former healthcare CEO, and one of the foremost figures in bringing organizational excellence principles into healthcare. He founded Catalysis, a nonprofit education institute, in 2008. Catalysis has built peer-to-peer learning networks and developed workshops, books, and other products. Toussaint has written three books that each received the Shingo Research and Publication Award -- "On the Mend," "Potent Medicine," and "Management on the Mend" -- and a more recent book, "Becoming the Change," written with Kim Barnas.
Skip Steward is Vice President and Chief Improvement Officer at Baptist Memorial Health Care, headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. He develops, directs, and implements performance improvement activities across the system -- identifying inefficiencies, improving quality, service, and finances, and building a culture of continuous improvement and excellence. He is a co-author of "Creating an Effective Management System," written with Patrick Graupp of the TWI Institute and Brad Parsons.
Dr. Greg Jacobson is the CEO and a co-founder of KaiNexus. He earned a BS in biology from Washington University in St. Louis and attended Baylor College of Medicine, then completed an emergency medicine residency at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, where he stayed on as faculty -- and where he was introduced to kaizen and continuous improvement. Still an active practicing ER physician, Jacobson is, in his own framing, fanatical about the single biggest barrier holding companies back from greatness: their lack of continuous improvement work. That conviction led him to develop and grow KaiNexus.
The panel opened on the question directly. People who equate Lean with standardization often fear that focusing on standard work produces rigidity. Each panelist took it apart.
John Toussaint started from a clinical analogy. In clinical medicine, evidence comes from placebo-controlled, double-blind studies that establish what works. But in management, there are almost no evidence-based activities and therefore no standards -- and without standards, nothing can be improved. That, he said, is why Lean has been so critical for so many organizations worldwide. He had just spoken with a CEO in Johannesburg who said that without a Lean management system she probably could not have survived the crisis there. Toussaint's deeper point: when you have standards and standard work, the work runs reliably every day, you are not running around in chaotic mode -- and that frees you to think bigger, to consider the harder problems that might come. Better-used standard work for management, he argued, would have left organizations far better prepared for the pandemic.
Skip Steward built on it. A standard outcome requires a standard method to produce it -- and whatever you create first usually does not work, so you have to experiment your way forward. Standardization, in that sense, unleashes experimentation and creativity rather than suppressing them. Done right, with respect and humility, it lets teams study and adjust, study and adjust, every single day.
Greg Jacobson called the standard-work-equals-inflexibility association unfortunate. Organizations doing this well, in his experience, are exactly the opposite of inflexible. The organizations that resist these practices are the ones that say "that's just the way we do things here," with no agitation from leadership to constantly rethink the work. His framing was a design analogy: human creativity flourishes when constraints are placed on it. Imagine an artist with no discipline at all, drifting between watercolors, sculpture, and poetry -- it is the constraint of the discipline that creates the beauty. Jacobson deliberately used "constraint" rather than "standard work" to expand the idea. Whether you work in a hospital or a software company, you are designing a workflow, a process, the next step -- and you cannot get creative about improving it until you have defined the standard. Once you define it and then build a methodology that constantly invites people to question and improve it, what seemed inflexible turns out to be highly flexible.
Graban followed up: does a structured improvement approach -- small kaizen, Toyota Kata, other frameworks -- help unleash creativity?
Toussaint gave a pandemic example. Mount Sinai Morningside Hospital, in the depths of the crisis, was asking frontline workers to solve hundreds of problems a day -- and they did, with ideas managers and executives would never have thought of. The staff converted 60 rooms to ICU rooms in five days; outpatient GI rooms were converted entirely by staff, using PDSA cycles to test whether changes worked and adjusting quickly. The lesson: the management system has to support that unleashing of creativity, and in most organizations the structure does not exist. A management system that lets people rapidly identify and solve problems at the front line is what lets that resource be used at the highest level.
Steward added that it is genuinely counterintuitive. Whether it is the Improvement and Coaching Kata or the A3 format, the structure expands creativity rather than narrowing it -- and only once you are inside it do you see the structure becoming a friend. His analogy: great athletes do not show up and just swing the bat however they want, hoping it works out on game day. They practice in a highly structured way, and it is on game day that their creativity and true athletics expand.
Graban asked Jacobson what he remembered thinking, as a resident, when he first encountered Masaaki Imai's work on kaizen. Jacobson reframed the answer around two categories of improvement work. Bottom-up improvement is initiated by someone on the front line -- the small "just-do-its" or opportunities for improvement, or the identification of a defect. Top-down improvement may originate at the front line but rises to a higher level because it is a bigger, more complex problem -- projects, larger PDSAs and A3s, multidisciplinary teams. The rigidity has to match the work. If a frontline idea system makes someone answer 15 questions to submit an idea, participation collapses -- an ER doctor with patients to see is not going to spend five and a half minutes on a phone. Flip it: let people launch a six-month, 25-resource, $10,000 project with no questions asked, and you will get a lot of bad projects. Both need a thought process, calibrated to cost, risk, and -- in a pandemic -- speed. Converting rooms to ICU beds was not low-cost or low-risk, but the speed required made it function like bottom-up work; in a normal, longer cycle it would have been irrelevant.
Jacobson closed the point with a healthcare parallel. Physicians follow a very specific order -- chief complaint, history of present illness, review of systems, past medical and surgical history, social history, physical exam starting with vital signs, differential diagnosis, then a plan to test it. There is a specific reason the order is what it is, and a reason you do not just tell a resident to "go figure out what's going on in room four." A process often encodes the order in which thoughts must occur to reach the best available answer. Different improvement activities need different levels of rigidity, and following that structure is what produces the highest-quality improvement work.
Steward described Baptist Memorial Health Care's pandemic response through its management system -- what some would call Lean -- built on 11 guiding principles, with behaviors flowing from those principles.
What surprised him was the volume of calls, texts, and emails he received from mid-March through mid-July thanking him for the Baptist management system. When he dug into what people meant, two things came back consistently. First, the scientific way of thinking from the Improvement Kata -- it had become normal and natural for people to say "let's run an experiment," instead of the more human default of jumping to conclusions. Second, and the one that surprised him most, an overwhelming response thanking him for TWI Job Relations. Training Within Industry has three legs -- job instruction, job relations, and job methods -- and Job Relations is about how to deal with people, how to lead so people follow, and how to handle a people problem in a structured, respectful way rather than reacting emotionally.
Baptist's leaders also lived out the principles of humility, trust, and empathy. The CEO did rounds with nurses all day, dressed in full medical gear, to walk a day in their shoes. There were no layoffs; the system raised significant funds to help people in economic need. And employee engagement scores went through the roof -- Press Ganey told Baptist they could not explain why the scores were rising while everyone else's fell.
Steward's closing story: a physician called him on a Saturday, uncertain the nasal COVID test on the testing line was being done correctly. She was not really calling for help -- she was using him as a sounding board. She was going to create a job instruction breakdown of exactly how the test should be done, road-test it as an experiment, and report back. By Monday, that job instruction breakdown had gone through many iterations and was being spread to Baptist's 22 hospitals within a couple of days of being created.
Toussaint offered more examples from the many organizations he works with.
Torrance Memorial in California, instead of furloughing people, took 500 idle staff and had them build PPE -- shields, wipes -- and redeployed them to entrances to take temperatures. UMass Memorial did the same: no layoffs, no furloughs, redeployment to areas of need. Toussaint called that the ultimate respect for people -- when you genuinely respect people, you do not lay them off, and you make sure they are safe and have what they need.
Christie Clinic made early radical changes. Because uninfected patients did not want to come to a clinic where they might be mixed with infected patients, the clinic began examining patients in their cars -- drive up to the carport, get examined in the car, get directed to the ER or to less aggressive care as needed. They also cut the time from registration through wait to under two minutes -- just-in-time examinations for patients who genuinely needed to be seen.
Toussaint's framing: this is what is so terrific about a principle-based method. When you are genuinely principle-based, you focus on your people, keep them safe, take care of them economically, and avoid layoffs -- and the organizations without those principles did the opposite.
Jacobson spoke from three angles.
At KaiNexus itself: the moment the NBA canceled its season was when the reality hit him that this was something different from anything they had dealt with, and his obsession with learning about the pandemic began. The company went remote -- an easy decision, despite KaiNexus never having seen itself as a remote company. And leadership made a commitment: as the CRO Jeff Roussel put it in his own vivid way, no one gets thrown off the boat -- everyone would cut their left arm off before anyone got thrown off. Pay cuts, no firings, and -- as a startup -- full transparency with all the numbers, so people knew their jobs were secure.
Among customers, what warmed Jacobson most was seeing healthcare customers use KaiNexus for pandemic efforts. The example he cited: Mike McGowan from Marietta Memorial showing a COVID response board, the team huddling virtually around a board carrying all the pertinent metrics and information for the hospital's COVID response. Even outside healthcare, very few organizations were not doing something pandemic-related with their improvement work, and it was clear that organizations with the best improvement cultures responded best -- because adaptability is the foundation of Lean. Jacobson's visualization: a company that stops innovating and adapting will die, whether in 5 or 10 or 20 years, because the world changes -- roughly 80% of the Fortune 500 turns over in 20 years. Organizations with adaptability built into their DNA adapt faster. The last seven months, he said, had compressed 30 years of business change into six or seven, and organizations already practicing adaptability well could move at a hyper rate.
Jacobson connected Steward's testing-line story to Daniel Pink's "Drive." Intrinsic motivation rests on autonomy, mastery, and purpose -- and the physician in that story clearly had all three: she knew how the swab should be done, she felt autonomous enough to act, and her purpose was to do her job well. A deep understanding of intrinsic motivation is critical in improvement work, because you cannot build a culture of continuous improvement with external motivation tactics. There are times external motivation matters; improvement work is not one of them.
Graban raised the articles -- including in the Wall Street Journal -- blaming Lean for shortages of paper towels and PPE, articles that equate Lean with low inventory rather than with adaptability. He noted that Akio Toyoda had described the key thing Toyota does as reducing lead times, which produces adaptability in a way that low inventory does not.
Toussaint's response was that those reporters miss how Lean thinking actually helps leaders through a crisis. They blame just-in-time as the reason for the trouble, and it simply is not true. Nobody could have fixed the supply chain issue of PPE being manufactured almost entirely overseas -- it is a real problem that needs addressing, but it was not going to be fixed in the moment. What Lean organizations could do was get creative: Torrance Memorial made its own PPE; Duke Health figured out how to use hydrogen peroxide cleaning to safely reuse face masks. Those ideas come from organizations that rely on their people to solve problems. There will always be someone shooting at Lean thinking, Toussaint said -- but the organizations with Lean management systems fared much better. And the structural problem the articles point at is, ironically, the opposite of Lean thinking: manufacturing PPE across an ocean is not lean, it does not shorten lead times, and organizations that genuinely use Lean thinking manage supply chains very differently, never relying on a single vendor.
The questions drew out several sharp distinctions.
On holding people accountable to standard work, Steward began by warning against weaponizing the word "accountability" to disrespect people. Before holding someone accountable, you have to ask what you are holding them accountable to. Often there is no standard for the outcome -- in which case whatever a person is doing seems good enough to them, and whatever process they use seems good enough by default. If there is a standard outcome but no standard method, you are asking people to guess -- and, as a mentor in Japan, Mr. Kato, told Steward, "you've chosen to neglect your people." Steward found that harsh but fair. When the real people who do the real work participate in creating both the standard outcome and the standard method, accountability stops being difficult -- though it still requires follow-up, the habits and routines that confirm whether people can follow the standard or are struggling with it. Skipping that follow-up is itself a form of disrespect. Graban added the distinction he learned from a mentor: whether someone won't follow standard work or can't follow it -- and if they can't, that is a system issue. Steward connected it back to TWI Job Relations: a boss with hundreds of reports does not automatically have followers; Job Relations is about how to motivate and lead people to follow a standard, and how to involve them since they know the work best. Toussaint preferred the word "responsibility" -- a responsibility to each other to do the work a certain way -- noting that without a defined standard, it is simply chaos, the wild west.
On the difference between "work standards" and "standardized work," Steward drew on a year of study in Japan. Standardized work, as Mr. Kato described Toyota's view, is the full package -- a standard outcome, a standard method, and within that method the order and the rate (leading toward concepts like takt time). Work standards, the way Steward thinks about it, are typically the methods that produce the standard outcome. His example: improving a COVID testing line, he asked the executive what standard outcome he wanted; the answer was vague -- "quality" and "efficient." Steward respectfully pushed for specifics -- how fast, how quick, exactly what quality means in measurable terms -- and only once the outcome was articulated could they experiment toward a standard method to produce it.
On evidence-based medicine and standard work, an attendee asked what happens when there is no agreement on the evidence. Jacobson framed it through order sets. Order sets that allow no flexibility and no deviation tend to create animosity; the ones that work well remind clinicians of things they might forget on an average day -- smoking cessation for an admitted pneumonia patient who smokes, for instance -- while still letting a physician deviate and record a reason. Some well-established science should have a higher threshold for deviation. And once an EMR holds big data, you can see whether a physician who deviates gets better or worse outcomes -- feedback that might change the order set or change the physician's practice. Toussaint called it a sticky wicket: only about 30% of what medicine does is solidly evidence-based, leaving 70% that is not. His answer from his CEO days: take a stance and create standard work even without evidence, because you cannot know whether something works until you have a standard for it -- and five physicians each doing something different is chaos. Where evidence was lacking, his hospitals built consensus among physicians around the standard work to use, then studied and improved it -- PDSA again. What is not acceptable is "I'm a doctor, I can do whatever I want," because continuous improvement is not about my way versus your way; it is about establishing a way so you can study whether that way works.
Toussaint pointed to the Epic Health Research Network -- a site pooling de-identified observational data from tens of millions of patients, publishing studies roughly weekly. The anticoagulation findings for COVID patients, he noted, emerged from that observational data in mid-March -- Lee Memorial among the first to identify it -- long before placebo-controlled studies were possible. Jacobson and Graban added that a well-designed, accessible EMR lets organizations run comparisons -- one anesthesiologist versus another, one ENT getting patients out of post-op in five hours versus another in ten -- and that 99 of 100 physicians, shown that gap, will want to learn what the faster colleague does. Jacobson, speaking as a frontline physician, said he welcomes the heated consensus discussions and the recommendations of ID and pulmonology colleagues -- they remind him of things and make him a better physician.
The final question proposed an equation: continuous improvement and Lean equals daily discipline equals culture.
Jacobson said the questioner had it spot on. A culture of continuous improvement is nothing other than a collection of a lot of people's aligned behaviors -- he cited Seth Godin's definition, "people like us do things like this." And the only way to sustain repetitive behavior -- you cannot practice Lean on Monday and forget it -- is to create habits. He recommended "The Power of Habit" by Charles Duhigg and "Atomic Habits" by James Clear for understanding how to build cues and routines and change behavior. Steward added a third, "Tiny Habits," and the point that we are all products of our habits -- the question is whether they are the habits we want, and whether principles are informing them. His and Kim Barnas's framing in "Becoming the Change": this is a sociotechnical system, and without the habits, the social side fails and the technical side does not survive.
Greg Jacobson closed the session by pointing to a personal project -- the weekly letters he began writing to friends and family at the start of the pandemic, distilling the best medical and pandemic data for a non-scientific audience, collected at letters2humans.com.
This panel is a conversation about ideas and behaviors -- standard work, structure, respect for people, habits, culture. The substance is method and leadership, not software, and Greg Jacobson, though KaiNexus's CEO, spent his time on the same conceptual ground as the other panelists. But several of the panel's concrete examples are infrastructure stories, and the panel's central conclusion points directly at what infrastructure does.
The clearest example was Jacobson's own: Mike McGowan from Marietta Memorial showing a COVID response board, with the team huddling virtually around a board carrying all the pertinent COVID-response metrics. That is a daily-management-and-visual-management function delivered through a platform. When a team can no longer gather around a physical board, the board has to live somewhere everyone can see it -- and a digital improvement platform is what makes a virtual huddle around shared, current metrics possible. The panel's argument that empowered frontline teams solve problems leaders cannot see depends on those problems and their solutions being visible; infrastructure is how visibility survives a crisis that scatters the team.
Skip Steward's testing-line story is a spread story. A physician's job instruction breakdown went through many iterations and reached 22 hospitals within a couple of days of being created. That kind of speed -- a good local solution propagating across a 22-hospital system in days -- is exactly the spread problem improvement infrastructure addresses. A standard captured in one place, visible and adoptable across every facility, is how one nurse's or one physician's fix becomes the whole system's standard before the crisis moves on. On physical boards and in email, that propagation is slow; in shared infrastructure, it is days.
Jacobson's bottom-up versus top-down framing is a direct argument about how a system should be designed. His point that 15 questions on an idea-submission form collapses frontline participation, while a frictionless path to large unvetted projects produces bad projects, is a specification for improvement infrastructure: the friction has to match the work. A platform that lets a frontline "just-do-it" be captured in seconds while routing a complex problem through the structure a multidisciplinary project genuinely needs is what makes both kinds of improvement work viable at once. The rigidity, calibrated to cost, risk, and speed, is a workflow design problem.
And the panel's closing equation -- continuous improvement equals daily discipline equals culture, sustained through habits -- is the strongest connection. Jacobson defined culture as aligned repetitive behavior, and said the only way to sustain it is to build habits with cues and routines. A habit needs a cue, and infrastructure provides durable cues -- a notification when an idea needs a response, a board reviewed at the same huddle every morning, a dashboard that is always current. The panel's whole case is that Lean organizations adapt faster because daily improvement is habitual rather than heroic. Infrastructure is part of what makes the habit hold: it removes the friction that lets discipline lapse, and it keeps the improvement work visible enough that the daily routine has something concrete to act on.
None of this changes the panel's message. Standard work enables agility. Structure unleashes creativity. Respect for people is a principle, not a slogan. Culture is aligned habit. Those are leadership choices and human behaviors, and no platform performs them. What infrastructure does is hold the conditions the panel described -- visible daily metrics that survive a scattered team, fast spread of proven standards across many facilities, friction calibrated to the work, and durable cues for the habits -- so that the adaptability the panel credits to Lean is something an organization can sustain when the next period of uncertainty arrives.
Does standardization make organizations inflexible? The panel's answer was a firm no -- and correcting that misconception was the reason for the session. You cannot improve a process you have not first defined, so standards are the precondition for improvement, not the enemy of it. When standard work makes daily operations reliable, teams are not running around in chaos -- they are freed to think bigger about harder problems. Greg Jacobson's framing: human creativity flourishes under constraints, the way an artist's discipline is what creates beauty. Organizations doing Lean well are highly flexible; the rigid ones are the ones that say "that's just how we do things here."
Why do Lean organizations adapt faster in a crisis? Because adaptability is the foundation of Lean. Organizations with strong improvement cultures have built adaptability into their DNA -- they rely on frontline people to identify and solve problems quickly, they use PDSA cycles to test and adjust, and daily improvement is a habit rather than a special effort. Greg Jacobson observed that the pandemic compressed roughly 30 years of business change into six or seven months, and organizations already practicing adaptability could move at a hyper rate. The panel stressed this applies beyond crises -- uncertainty is constant, and the same systems that helped in the pandemic help in any changing environment.
How does standard work enable agility instead of limiting it? Standard work creates a stable, reliable baseline. Without it, teams operate in chaos, with five people doing the same task five different ways, and nothing can be measured or improved. With it, daily work runs reliably, which frees attention for harder problems and faster adaptation. Skip Steward added that a standard outcome requires a standard method, and arriving at that method takes experimentation -- so standardization actually unleashes creativity and experimentation rather than suppressing it.
Does a structured improvement approach unleash creativity? Yes, though the panel acknowledged it is counterintuitive. Frameworks like the Improvement and Coaching Kata or the A3 format expand creativity rather than narrowing it -- and only once people are inside the structure do they find it becomes a friend. Skip Steward's analogy: great athletes practice in a highly structured way, and it is on game day that their creativity expands. John Toussaint's pandemic example was Mount Sinai Morningside, where frontline staff -- given a supporting structure -- converted 60 rooms to ICU rooms in five days using PDSA cycles.
What is the difference between bottom-up and top-down improvement work? Greg Jacobson's two categories. Bottom-up improvement is initiated at the front line -- small "just-do-its," opportunities for improvement, defect identification. Top-down improvement addresses bigger, more complex problems through projects, larger PDSAs and A3s, and multidisciplinary teams. The key design point is that the rigidity must match the work: too many barriers on frontline idea submission collapses participation, while a frictionless path to large unvetted projects produces bad projects. The right level of structure depends on cost, risk, and -- in a crisis -- the speed required.
What did Baptist Memorial Health Care do during the pandemic? Baptist relied on its management system, built on 11 guiding principles. Skip Steward received an unusual volume of thanks for two things: the scientific thinking habit from the Improvement Kata, which made "let's run an experiment" a natural response instead of jumping to conclusions; and TWI Job Relations, which gave leaders a structured, respectful way to deal with people problems. Leaders modeled humility, trust, and empathy -- the CEO rounded with nurses in full medical gear -- and the system avoided layoffs, raised funds for staff in need, and saw employee engagement scores rise sharply.
How did Lean organizations handle the PPE shortage without just-in-time being the problem? John Toussaint argued that articles blaming Lean and just-in-time for shortages misunderstand how Lean works. Nobody could fix, in the moment, the structural problem that PPE was manufactured almost entirely overseas -- and that overseas concentration is itself the opposite of Lean thinking, which shortens lead times and never relies on a single vendor. What Lean organizations could do was get creative: Torrance Memorial built its own PPE; Duke Health used hydrogen peroxide cleaning to safely reuse masks. Those solutions came from organizations that rely on their people to solve problems.
What does "respect for people" look like in a crisis? The panel's examples were concrete. Torrance Memorial redeployed 500 idle staff to build PPE and screen entrances rather than furloughing them; UMass Memorial committed to no layoffs and no furloughs, redeploying people to areas of need; Baptist Memorial avoided layoffs and raised funds for staff facing economic hardship. John Toussaint called this the ultimate respect for people -- when you genuinely respect people, you keep them employed, safe, and supported. Principle-based organizations did this; organizations without those principles did the opposite.
How should leaders hold people accountable to standard work? Skip Steward warned against weaponizing "accountability" to disrespect people, and said the first question is what you are holding people accountable to. If there is no standard outcome, whatever people do seems good enough; if there is an outcome but no standard method, you are asking people to guess. When the people who do the work participate in creating both the standard outcome and the method, accountability becomes straightforward -- though it still requires follow-up. Mark Graban added the distinction of whether someone won't follow the standard or can't -- and if they can't, that is a system problem, not a personal one.
What is the difference between "work standards" and "standardized work"? Skip Steward, drawing on study in Japan, described standardized work as the full package -- a standard outcome, a standard method, and within that method the order and rate of the work (leading toward concepts like takt time). Work standards, as he uses the term, are typically the methods that produce the standard outcome. He stressed starting with a specific, measurable standard outcome -- not vague language like "quality" and "efficient" -- and only then experimenting toward the method that reliably produces it.
How should organizations handle standard work when the medical evidence isn't settled? John Toussaint noted that only about 30% of what medicine does is solidly evidence-based. His answer, from his CEO experience: take a stance and create standard work even without evidence, because you cannot know whether something works until there is a standard for it -- and five physicians each doing something different is chaos. Where evidence was lacking, his hospitals built physician consensus around the standard work to use, then studied and improved it through PDSA. Greg Jacobson added that order sets work best when they allow flexibility to deviate (with a recorded reason), and that EMR data lets organizations see whether deviation produces better or worse outcomes.
Is continuous improvement really just daily discipline and culture? The panel agreed it largely is. Greg Jacobson defined culture as a collection of many people's aligned behaviors -- citing Seth Godin's "people like us do things like this" -- and said the only way to sustain repetitive improvement behavior is to build habits, since you cannot practice Lean on Monday and forget it. He recommended "The Power of Habit" and "Atomic Habits"; Skip Steward added "Tiny Habits." The panel's framing: continuous improvement is a sociotechnical system, and without the habits, the social side fails and the technical side cannot survive.
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